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When Memory Speaks: Remembrance and
Revenge in Unforgivent
AUSTIN SARAT*
But he also wondered about himself, that he cannot learn to forget but always
remains attached to the past: however far and fast he runs, the chain runs with
him. It is astonishing: the moment, here in a wink, gone in a wink, nothing before
and nothing after, returns nevertheless as a specter to disturb the calm of a later
moment. Again and again a page loosens in the scroll of time, drops out, and
flutters away-and suddenly flutters back again into a man's lap. Then man says
"I remember" and envies the animal which immediately forgets and sees each
moment really die, sink back into deep night extinguished for ever.
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it "the way it really
was." It means to seize hold of memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.
... Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past
who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he
wins.2
INTRODUCTION
What is the role of memory in vengeance and the violence it entails? What are the
relationships among past, present, and future that vengeance creates? How are
narrative connections made between those who are injured and those who use
violence to reply to injuries? Do certain kinds of memories sustain vengeance while
others diminish it?
In the typical revenge story the answers to these questions seem straightforward:
injury demands redress and when redress is not forthcoming injuries should not be
forgotten? Victims seek both to remember but also to obliterate memory, to attend to
the past and yet to make a different recollection. Memory is for victims a source of
pain; the past constitutes the true victimization." They seek to rectify the past, to
t Copyright 2002 by Austin Sarat.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst
College. An earlier version ofthis Article was presented at the Symposium on "Law, Morality,
and Popular Culture in the Public Sphere" at the Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, April 6, 2001 and at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association in Budapest, Hungary. I am grateful to the participants in those events as well as
to DediFelman, Susan Sage Heinzelman, Ian Malcolm, Richard Sherwin, and Martha Umphrey
for their generous and helpful comments.
1. FREEDRICHN[ET7SCHE,THEUSEANDABUSEOFHISTORY 8-9 (Adrian Collins trans., 2d
rev. ed. 1957).
2. WALTER BENIAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 255
(Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968).
3. See JOHNKERRIGAN, REVENGETRAGEDYFROM AESCHYLUS TO ARMAGEDDON (1996).
4. Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire, 26
REPRESENTATIONS 16 (1989).
In the last analysis, it is upon the individual and upon the individual alone that
the constraint of memory weighs insistently as well as imperceptibly. The
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placate memory by silencing the ghosts whose constant call is for vengeance. They
hope that a new memory, the memory of a blood-letting punishment, "can be
substituted for the shameful memory of the evil deed that one was powerless to
prevent. '5
For those who advocate conceptions of justice that are not based on vengeance,
memory is also an important resource.' Jacques Derrida, for example, insists on the
connection of memory and justice when he says, "No justice ... seems possible or
thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present...
before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead. . . ." In
Derrida's view, doingjustice requires that we remember the future as well as the past,
that we keep before us the specters of both.'
Yet, the links between memory and justice are more troubled and troubling than can
be captured in this simple admonition. This is because vengeance expresses "a wish
to change the world and right the past, to be seen and counted in a private and
ultimately a public conversion of memory, to reassign guilt and to end that unending
memory of horror that is, says Aeschylus, 'a relentless anguish gnawing at the
heart."' 9 This "wish to change the world" and the "relentless anguish" that is revenge
have long been the objects of critique in legal and political thought.'
atomization of a general memory into a private one has given the obligation to
remember a power of internal coercion ... [W]hen memory is no longer
everywhere, it will not be anywhere unless one takes the responsibility to
recapture it through individual means.
Id.
5. Terry K. Aladjem, Vengeance & Democratic Justice: American Culture and the Limits
of Punishment 25 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
6. Minow notes, "To seek a path between vengeance and forgiveness is also to seek a
route between too much memory and too much forgetting." MARTHA MNOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 118
(1998).
7. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF DEBT, THE WORK OF
MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL xix (Peggy Kamuf trans., Routledge 1994)
(emphasis in original).
8. As Valverde puts it, for Derrida, "[m]emory, both personal and collective, is essential
for the work ofjustice, and therefore ghosts, as the intermediaries between the dead and the
living, are the key figures ofjustice, the heralds, if you will, of ajustice that can never present
itself." Mariana Valverde, Derrida's Justice and Foucault's Freedom: Ethics, History, and
Social Movements, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 655, 662 (1999). On the importance of
remembering the future as well as the past, see Drucilla Cornell, Post-Structuralism, the
Ethical Relation, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1587 (1988).
9. Aladjem, supra note 5, at 26.
10. In their unceasing efforts to overcome id with superego and to construct a legitimating
ideology, modem legal orders seek to substitute the calm calculation of deterrence, the
empathetic understanding of rehabilitation, and the stem, but controlled, discipline of
retribution for the emotionalism of revenge. See MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: Eva. FOR
EVILIN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1990); see also Michael Davis, Harm andRetribution,
in PUNISHmENT 188 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995). Justice becomes public and the voice
of the victim, or the vengeful anger of the victim's kin or champion, is merged with the
distanced state bureaucracy which speaks for "The People" against whom all offenses to the
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"The official antivengeance discourse," William Miller notes, "has a long history
even preceding the Stoics, taken up and elaborated by medieval churchmen and later
by the architects of state building.... Revenge still plays the role of eminence grise,
the defining Other, classic texts of liberal moral and political philosophy.""
Those who pursue vengeance seem like troublemakers, malcontents, people
unwilling to let go of a painful past.' Moreover, the vengeance they seek is akin to
hatred. It is a defiant and "sinful" unwillingness to forget injuries and forgive those
who injure us.13 It is "crazed, uncontrolled, subjective, individual, admitting no
reason, no rule of limitation .... Conventional wisdom conceives of vengeance
cultures as barely cultured at all, all id and no superego: big dumb brutes looking for
excuses to kill."' 4 Modem legality is founded on the belief that revenge can and must
be repressed, that legal punishment can be founded on reason, that due process can
discipline passion, and that these categories are both knowable and distinct.
Retribution, with its advertised virtues of measured proportionality, cool detachment,
and consistency is contrasted with vengeance-the voice of the other, the primitive,
the savage call of unreason, a "wildness" inside the house of law which, by nature,
will not succumb to rational forms of justice.'5
criminal law are said to be directed. See Lawrence Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory
of the Law of Crimes 3 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 262 (1974).
11. William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: The Virtues of Revenge and the
Shortcomings ofLaw in Popular Culture, in LAW AND THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 161, 161-62
(Austin Sarat & Thomas Keams eds., 1998).
12. "Such people are disturbers ofthe peace; we wish they would take their memories away
to a church, a cemetery, a psychotherapist's office and allow us to return justice and vengeance
to the separate compartments they supposedly occupy in twentieth-century life." SUsAN
JACOBY, WIlD JusTICE: THE EvOLUTION OF REVENGE 2 (1983); see also FRANCIS BACON, Of
Revenge, in SELECTED WRITINGS (Modem Library 1955) (1857-74).
13. See Jeffrie Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of the Victim, 7 Soc. PHIL & POL 216
(1990); see also JEFFRm MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1998); ST.
AUGUSTINE, THE WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 168-69 (New York, Fathers ofthe Church 1947)
(n.d.).
14. Miller, supra note 11, at 162-65.
15. "Insofar as humanly possible ... law attempts to remove personal animus from the
process of apportioning blame and exacting retribution. It is the removal of personal animus
... that distinguishes the rule of law from the rule of passion." JACOBY, supra note 12, at 115.
In addition, as Aladjem observes:
This inclination to make revenge over into a rational principle ofjustice has roots
in democratic theory and in certain suppositions of natural law. It arose in claims
about the founding of the state, where it was said that a process of consent
converts the laws of nature into those of civil society and that the state acquires
its right to punish from consenting individuals who thereby relinquish a natural
right to avenge themselves. From the beginning, however, that reasoning presents
a paradox: the state is supposed to arise from the inclinations of individuals as
they might be found in nature, but it must rescue them from the very same
inclinations.
[A] vengeful "natural man" turns to the state as a place of appeal from
the injustices of nature and from the excesses of his own revenge.
2002]
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Vengeance must be kept at bay, so the argument goes, because it represents an
unwarranted concession to an anger and passion that knows no limits. 6 Yet
vengeance is never fully and finallypurged froma system of legal justice. It persists
because the dispassion of legal justice is, for many, a frustrating and inadequate
response to grievous injury. 7 Revenge is an urge lurking in the shadows, whose
presence, at least in liberal theory, provides one reason for the founding of the
modem state, and whose continuing force fuels the apparatus of punishment itself.'"
Revenge can be renamed, but not extinguished. It canbe repressed, but neither denied
nor forgotten.
Martha Minow's "Memory and Hate: Are There Lessons From Around the
World?" reminds us of the persistence of revenge and the role of memory in the
constitution of vengeance.19 Minow suggests that memory, whether the memory of
vengeance latent in all legal systems or the memory that calls for revenge, is
constructed out of "bits of information selected and arranged in light of prior
narratives and current expectations, needs and beliefs." 0 Memories are made and
marketed by persons and groups with distinct political agendas. They associate
vengeance with honor, arousing vengeful violence by glorifying and/or romanticizing
it.
But unremediated injury does not automatically call for vengeance or become the
stuff of a vengeance seeking memory. Memory may be made to play other roles,
constraining if not obliterating vengeful impulses. Some ways of remembering bring
about change; others do not. Some keep alive horror; others do not. Some fuel
vengeful violence; others do not.
Minow calls on those interested in understanding vengeance and the violence it so
often entails to attend to the complex, paradoxical, frequently contradictory role that
memory plays, sometimes prompting a quest for revenge that seems insatiable,
sometimes quelling it.2 Taking up Minow's call means turning from the disciplined
Terry Aladjem, Revenge and Consent 9, 16 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Indiana Law Journal) (emphasis in original).
16. For a discussion of the role of emotion in punishment, see Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional
Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655 (1989).
As Connolly puts it, "[o]nce revenge infiltrates the call to punish, this eminently deniable drive
can expand indefinitely." WilLtAM CONNOLLY, THE ETHos OF PLURALIZATION 42 (1995).
17. JuDITH SHKIAR, THE FACEs OF INJUsTIcE 94 (1990).
18. "Revenge is neither something which can be left behind in nature nor is it a
transferrable right. Like Locke's state of nature, it [is] always with us ... ." Aladjem, supra
note 5, at 36. Or as Connolly argues,
Punishment.. . exacts revenge on the past, and the past is not necessarily
confined to the past acts of the one punished .... Revenge through law offers
immediate gratification to the offended. ... In crime and punishment two
contending calls to revenge clash on the streets and in the courts, and each is
refueled by the collisions between them.
CONNOLLY, supra note 16, at 48.
19. Martha Minow, Memory and Hate: Are There Lessons from Around the World?,
Gilbane Lecture at Brown University (Oct. 19, 1999) (transcript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 23-24.
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effort to marshal evidence about the "truth" ofhistoryto the slippery terrain on which
individuals and groups invent traditions' and record partisan versions of the past on
the basis of which they seek to construct a new present.' "Memory," Pierre Nora
writes,
is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic ofremembering and forgetting,
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation
and appropriation. ... History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction
... of what is no longer... History, because it is an intellectual and
secular production, calls for analysis and criticism .... At the heart of
history is a critical discourse that is antithetical to ... memory.
24
Acts of commemoration are the very stuff of politics; in and through our political
processes we decide who or what should be remembered or memorialized and in what
waysO As David Thelen argues, "[M]emory, private and individual as much as
collective and cultural, is constructed, not reproduced.... [T]his construction is not
made in isolation but in conversations with others that occur in the contexts of
community, broader politics, and social dynamics."'
In the present, as Nora reminds us, memory is "above all, archival. It relies entirely
on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the
image .... Even as traditional memory disappears, we feel obliged assiduously to
collect remains, testimonies, documents, images, speeches, any visible signs of what
22. See THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
23. On the distinction between history and memory, see JACQUES LEGOFF, HISTORY AND
MEMORY (Steven Rendall & Elizabeth Claman trans., 1992).
24. Nora, supra note 4, at 8-9. But see Natalie Zemon Davis & Randolph Stare,
Introduction, 26 REPRESENTATIONS 5 (1989) ("Rather than insisting on the opposition between
memory and history... we want to emphasize their interdependence."). Or, as Burke argues,
"Both history and memory are coming to appear increasingly problematic. Remembering the
past and writing about it no longer seem the innocent activities they were once taken to be.
Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. ... In both cases... selection,
interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned." Peter Burke, History as Social Memory,
in MEMORY: HISTORY, CULTURE AND THE MIND 97-98 (Thomas Butler ed., 1989).
25. See John R Gillis, Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship, in
COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLITICS OFNATIONALIDENTITY 8 (John Gillis ed., 1994) (describing
memory as being "bom of... the conflicting representations of the past and the effort of each
group to make its version the basis of national identity); see also PAUL CONNERTON, How
SOCIETIES REMEMBER (1989); MICHAEL KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1991); Barry Schwartz, The Social
Control of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory, 61 SOC. FORCES 15 (1982);
Nathan Wachtel, Introduction: Memory and History, 2 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 218 (1986).
26. David Thelen, Memory andAmerican History, 75 J. AM. HIsT. 1119 (1989). Valverde
notes that "memory is also always highly personal, partial, incomplete, shot through with
subjectivity and desire.. . [W]e do not simply see the past; we imagine it and feel it. Memories
are ... filled with powerful if ill-defined hopes and disappointments." Valverde, supra note
8, at 664.
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has been."27 Museums and monuments are today the locations of memory, the sites
to which collective memory is attached. If that is indeed the case, one might ask
whether tales of vengeance themselves might be one of what Nora calls les lieux de
memoire.2'
Here our interest is directed to the temporal dimension of revenge, the way it stands
in relation to the past, the present, and the future. Vengeance reenacts the past, both
intentionally and unconsciously, and it is one means by which the present speaks to
the future through acts of commemoration.29
In this Article I want to take up Minow's call to explore the link between memory
and vengeance. I explore different kinds of memories and their complex connections
to revenge through a reading of Clint Eastwood's Unforgiven." This 1992 film, a
classic of the revenge genre, commemorates the film Western, with its story of the
triumph of good over evil and of heroic men taming wild territory." But here
commemoration is not celebration. Unforgiven is a classic in part because it
complicates that story,3" surfacing repressed conflicts between the demands of heroic
action and the aspirations of a revenge-based justice.33 Indeed it might be more
accurate to call it a classic anti-Western, antirevenge film.
Unforgiven provides an unusuallythoughtful reflection on the complex connection
of remembrance and revenge. It is a story about storytelling and the consequences of
our stories for the lives we lead and the deeds we do. It puts storytelling itself on trial
as it explores the way memories are constructed and the way they mold action, and
it provides a commentary on the experience of film spectatorship itself, inviting its
viewers to interrogate the pull of fantasy as against the claims of the real. It does this
by contrasting "monumental" memory which glorifies violence, and direct, "realist"
memory which seems to restrain it or at least strip it of its glory. Unforgiven praises
realist memory and condemns monumental memory. In this film a past ofpurposeless
violence is unforgiven. Injuries unredressed are unforgiven. But violent revenge to
redress those injuries is also unforgiven. While we are called on to remember
unforgivable injury, certain kinds of remembering and certain responses may be
unforgivable.
27. Nora, supra note 4, at 13.
28. See id. at 12.
29. See generally COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra note
25.
30. UNFORGVEN (Malpaso Productions/Warner Brothers 1992). The transcript ofthe film
is available at http://www.clinteastwood.net/filmography/unforgiven.txt (last visited Oct. 25,
2001).
31. See M. Yacovar, Re-membering the Western: Clint Eastwood's 'Unforgiven', 100
QUEEN'S Q. 247 (Spring 1993); see also L. Engel, Rewriting Western Myths in Clint
Eastwood's New-Old Western, 29 W. AM. LrIERATuRE 261 (1994).
32. M.W. Blundell, Western Values, or the People's Homer: 'Unforgiven'as a Reading
of the 'Iliad', 18 POETICS TODAY 533 (1997).
33. Miller, supra note 11, at 183.
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I. THE VOICE OF REMEMBRANCE AND THE URGE TO REVENGE: HEROIC TALES AND
SIMPLE JUSTICE
trnforgiven tells the story of William Munny (playedby Clint Eastwood).1 Munny
was once one of the West's most ruthless and feared men, but at the opening of the
film he has retired from his life of violence and is a middle-aged, widowed father of
two, trying without great success to make a go of it as a pig farmer. The drama of the
film unfolds when a young cowboy, the Schofield Kid, appears at the farm and asks
Munny to join him in his plan to collect a $1000 reward. The reward, put up by a
group of prostitutes, is an inducement for vengeance. It is offered to anyone who kills
two men. Quick Mike, a hot-tempered brute, slashed Delilah, a prostitute who
laughed when she saw his tiny penis. The other, Davey, was inadvertently involved
in the slashing incident. The prostitutes post the reward when the town's sheriff,
Little Bill, responds to the slashing by letting the cowboys go on the promise that they
will compensate Skinny, the man who owns the saloon where the prostitutes work,
for the income he will lose because of the injuries to Delilah. As Miller says about
this part of Unforgiven, "[T]he slashed woman doesn't figure in Bill's compensatory
scheme; he agrees with Skinny in seeing her as property, or at least not sufficiently
individualized so as to have a compensable claim in her own right."'35
Delilah plays almost no role in the vengeance tale told in Unforgiven. Indeed she
is virtually voiceless. She makes no claim; she neither asks for remedy, nor seeks to
enlist others to speak or act on her behalf. Nonetheless the call for vengeance is
heard. The voice of vengeance speaks through Alice, another prostitute who becomes
Delilah's perhaps unwanted champion. As one of the prostitutes asks, "If Delilah
doesn't care one way or the other, what are we getting all riled up about?"36 This
unanswered question is about the structure of vengeance itself and about who is
authorized to speak the memory of injury.
When memory allies itself with vengeance, it is not always the victim who seeks
the alliance. Instead the memory of injury is often marketed by moral entrepreneurs
whose cause may not be identical to those on whose behalf they act.37 The vengeance
34. For an interesting analysis of the names Will and Munny, see Thomas Dumm,
Unworking Death in "Unforgiven": Law, Ethos, Violence 9, 10 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Indiana Law Journal).
35. Miller, supra note 11, at 184.
36. UNFORGIVEN supra note 30.
37. Thus legal systems in the United States and Europe have been confronted by stem
challenges in the name of victims' rights. See GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:
VICTMS' RIGHTS IN CRmNAL TRkLs (1995); see also Lois FORER, CRImINALS AND VICTIMS
(1980). Here and abroad a movement has emerged which seeks to speak for victims.
Hard on the heels of the civil rights movement, the women's liberation
movement, and the movement to expand the rights of criminal suspects, the
victims' rights movement burst on the scene in the early 1970s and quickly
became a potent political force. Part backlash against what it considered the
prodefendant romanticism of the 1960s, the victims' rights movement was also
a spiritual heir to the '60s ethos. With its suspicion of bureaucratic government
and its concern for the disempowered, the victims' rights movement spoke for the
"forgotten" men and women of the criminal justice system.
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imagined by such people is portrayed as a call for simple justice or, in its most
romantic sense, as full of emotion, demanding a proportional (or sometimes
excessive) response to injury and, in so doing, fighting a (historic) wrong. This
romantic revenge allegedly is gratifying to those who witness it and brings glory to
those who carry it out.
Throughout Unforgiven Alice speaks enthusiastically as the voice of this kind of
vengeance. Immediately after Delilah is slashed, Alice asks, "You gonna hang them,
Little Bill?"38 And, when Bill seems inclined to whip them instead, Alice says, "A
whipping? That's all they get after what they done." 9 Bill eventually settles on a
scheme to compensate Skinny. In response Alice says, "You ain't even gonna whip
them? ... For what they done Skinny gets some ponies and that's it? It ain't fair. '40
Bill answers by asking, "Ain't you seen enough blood for one night?' 1 Alice is
denied the legal redress she seeks not only because she and the other prostitutes are
chattel, but also because the law has been captured by its own community of interest
from which she is excluded.4 2
Alice with Little Bill
Stephen Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials: The Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L. 3.825 (1995).
The tendency of criminal justice systems in Western democracies is to displace the victim, to
shut the door on those with the greatest interest in seeing justice done. In response, those who
speak for victims are demanding that their voices be heard throughout the criminal justice
process. David Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the "Forgotten
Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REv. 35 (1989). "Historically," Roland argues, "crime victims have been
forgotten in the criminal justice system. The system, as it evolved, protected the rights of the
accused with zeal, while ignoring the victim's plight." See id.
38. UNFORGIVEN supra note 30.
39. Id.
40. id.
41. Id.
42. This point was suggested to me in a communication (May 4, 2001) from Richard
Sherwin.
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Here the basic structure of a revenge tale is put in place.43 An injury is done and the
law either does not respond or fails, from the perspective of the victim or those who
call on law to remember her injuries, to respond adequately." Yet we are reminded
that vengeance does not speak in a precise calculus of pain returned for pain inflicted.
Alice seeks death for the man who slashed Delilah's face and for his less-culpable
companion. Is death proportional to the injury inflicted? Do Mike and Davey both
deserve the same punishment?45
The contrast between Delilah's silence and Alice's insistent appropriation of her
cause is marked late in the film when the prostitutes learn that Davey has been shot
by Munny and the Schofield Kid. "I didn't think they would really do it," Delilah
remarks." In contrast, Alice yells to a crowd of men in the street, "He had it coming
for what he done! He had it coming and the other one too!"'4
But what is Alice's agenda? While some suggest that "[t]he women have interests
that justify their vengefulness on behalf of Delilah,"'48 Unforgiven leaves its viewers
unsure about why Alice believes that she can or should speak for Delilah. Is she like
the Balkan leaders who, Ignatieff tells us, stirred up war by convincing "neighbors
and friends that in reality they had been massacring each other since time
immemorial" when history "has no such lesson to teach ... ."T" Is her call for
vengeance based on a sympathetic identification with Delilah? Is she displacing her
own anger and resentment toward all of those who "ride" her and the otherprostitutes
"like horses"?' Or, is she making a prudent investment in deterrence? Whatever her
agenda she uses memory to fuel vengeance; she insists that without a full embrace of
revenge the memory of injury cannot be placated.
There are two other figures in the film who use memory to stoke the violence that
vengeance requires, but in neither case do they use their own memory. The first is the
Schofield Kid. The Kid enlists Munny as his partner.in responding to the prostitutes'
call for vengeance because he has heard of Munny's youthful exploits fromhis Uncle
Pete.
43. See KERRIGAN, supra note 3.
44. See generally Austin Sarat, Vengeance, Victims, and the Identities of Law, 6 SOC. &
LEGALSTuD. 163 (1997).
45. Miller, supra note 11, at 184.
46. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 185.
49. "Consciousness of ethnic difference... only turned into nationalist chauvinism when
a discredited Communist elite began manipulating nationalist emotions in order to cling to
power." Michael Ignatieff, The Balkan Tragedy, N.Y. REV. BooKs, May 13, 1993; at 3.
50. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
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The Schofield Kid
When he first encounters Munny, the latter is struggling in the pig pen on his farm.
Witnessing this scene, the Kid says:
You don't look like no rootin'-tootin', son-of-a bitchin', cold-blooded
assassin, ... [someone] that shot Charlie Pepper up in Lake County....
You shot Charlie Pepper, didn't you. [And] you're the one who killed
William Harvey who robbed that train over in Missouri. .... Uncle Pete
says that you were the meanest son of a bitch alive and that if I ever
wanted a partner for a killing you were the worst one,. . . on account as
you are cold as the snow. You don't have no weak nerve."1
Later he asks Will about another incident that his Uncle Pete has told him about, an
incident that foretells the film's climactic shootout in Skinny's saloon. "Say Will,"
the Kid asks, "that business up in Jackson County, that really happen?... There was
two deputies up close [to you. They] had you dead to rights. You pulled out your
pistol and blew them both to hell. Uncle Pete says he ain't never seen nothing like
it.",52
The Schofield Kid lives in a mythic world, a world of larger-than-life violent men
and of victims avenged. He has been immersed in the fantasy world of romanticized
violence and larger-than-life superheroes. Caught up in the spectacle, he is a stand-in
for the typical viewer of Westerns. Indeed, his description of Munny-"[y]ou don't
look like no rootin'-tootin', son-of-a-bitchin', cold-blooded assassin" --is a parody
of the language of that genre. The Schofield Kid presents us with a figure of someone
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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who seems unable to disentangle the image from the world beyond the image.' He
aspires to become an actor in his fantasy world, to become a heroic instrument of
vengeance, and, in so doing, attain manhood." He flees resignation (the resignation
of an ordinary life) and uses history as a means against resignation.' Through the
things he attributes to Munny he constructs what Nietzsche called "monumental"
history.' He projects a will to power onto a world he does not yet know. His version
of monumental history may itself be a simulacrum built on spectacle and legendary
tales," but whatever its source, he seeks "knowledge that the great thing existed and
was therefore possible and so maybe possible again. He is heartened on his way; for
his doubt in weaker moments, whether his desire is not for the impossible is struck
aside." 9 In most cases, however, no reward beckons him unless it be fame, that is, the
expectation of a place of honor "in the temple of history."'
When he first meets Munny, the Schofield Kid has not yet killed anyone. That the
Schofield Kid is young and has difficulty seeing more than fifty yards perhaps
foretells his fate. Thus, after his first and only killing, when fantasy and imagination
confront the stark reality of death, the Kid dramatically renounces violence. Giving
his gun to Munny, he says, "[K]eep it. I'm never going to use it again. I'm never
going to kill no one, no more. I ain't like you Will.... I guess I'd rather be blind and
ragged than dead." 61
Memory stands as the Kid's tutor. This time, however, the memory is not
monumental. This time it is his own remembrance of the stunned look of a man shbt
at close range in an outhouse. He learns the hard way that "true knowledge [is]...
based in physical experience.. .[and that] words [the kind of stories told to him by
his Uncle Pete)] ... cannot express the truth about things."'62 Here again the Schofield
Kid acts as the film's idealized viewer, someone who comes to appreciate the
difference between image and reality, someone who sees the virtue of the quotidian
in comparison to the fantastic.63
W. W. Beauchamp, dime novelist, biographer, and chronicler of the violent exploits
of the old West is the Kid's cinematic double in Unforgiven. He is the marketer of
heroic narratives, of glorious memories of the kind passed on from Uncle Pete to the
Schofield Kid. Like the Kid, he makes narratives out of the memories of others, but
unlike him, Beauchamp is neither young nor sightless. While the Kid needs
something to aid his vision, the film repeatedly calls attention to Beauchamp's
glasses. Whereas the Kid is young and full of bravado, Beauchamp is cynical and
cowardly. While the Kid is in every sense of the word a naive amateur, Beauchamp
54. Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42.
55. For the Schofield Kid, as for similar characters in other Westerns, "manhood can prove
itself only through risking death." JANE TOMPINS, WEST OFEVERYTHING: THE INERLUF OF
WESTERNS 33 (1992).
56. NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 13.
57. Id.
58. Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42.
59. NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 14.
60. Id. at 13.
61. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
62. TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 52-53 (emphasis in original).
63. Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42.
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is a professional, experienced in fashioning tall tales and heroic illusions. He knows
what he is about. He is a maker of myths and memories, not a scribe. He makes
memories of other people's memories, fashioning the kind of heroic tales that sustain
vengeful violence by eliding the grim realities that vengeful violence produces." As
Miller observes, "The presence ofBeauchamp makes the movie into something more
than a revenge story. It also becomes an essay on competing heroic styles and the
manner of heroic self-fashioning." 65
He is in the business of fashioning memory rather than recording history, glorifying
and romanticizing violence, turning it into mass entertainment without noting its
gruesome details. That Beauchamp has no stomach for the violence he chronicles is
suggested in a scene early in the film when he loses control of his bladder as guns are
drawn on him and English Bob (an English dandy who works for the railroad killing
Chinese and speaks with disdain about the absence of a monarchical tradition on the
frontier. "It is uncivilized shooting persons of substance,"' he says), and, later in the
film, when Beauchamp dramatically overreacts to the sight of someone else's blood
on his clothes.
Like the prostitutes who work in Skinny's establishment, the memories that
Beauchamp crafts, and Beauchamp himself, are continuously in circulation.' They
sell sex; he sells myths. In the film, we see him passed from English Bob to Little
Bill, and after the death of the latter, he tries to cozy up to Munny, only to have his
advances rejected.68
Earlier, when Little Bill reads what Beauchamp has written in a pamphlet about
English Bob entitled The Duke of Death, he mocks both the publication and its
allegedly heroic subject, pointing out its exaggerated claims and inflated rhetoric.
Beauchamp replies that it is "generally considered desirable in the publishing
business to take a certain liberty [with the cover story]," even as he assures Bill that
"the events described in the book are taken from the accounts of eyewitnesses."69
64. See Carl Plantinga, Spectacles ofDeath: Clint Eastwood and Violence in 'Unforgiven,'
37 CnMA J., Winter 1998 at 75-76.
65. Miller, supra note 11, at 195.
66. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
67. Munny, too, is a kind of prostitute, plying his death dealing trade in exchange for
money. See Dumm, supra note 34, at 9, 10.
68. This trio-English Bob, Little Bill, and Munny--are the old order, now passing from
the scene. The first is run out of town, the second is killed, the third disappears at the end of
the film.
69. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
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Little Bill Reading the "Duke of Death"
When Bill announces that he was, in fact, an eyewitness, Beauchamp's pretense to
accuracy quickly fades. He corrupts all by glorifying and romanticizing violence,
turning it into "fiction, to pretense, and to collusion between the media and the
subjects of its attention. 70
Unlike the Schofield Kid, Beauchamp is not repelled by violence. Indeed, in the
presence of a good story, he seems not to notice it. Because of his blindness to the
grim world of injury, pain, and death, he never renounces the heroic tales that he
fabricates. He is Unforgiven's representative of the movie Western before the fall,
lost in a world of spectacle he helps to create. By juxtaposing the Schofield Kid and
Beauchamp, the film asks its viewers to consider whether they too are so caught up
in fantasy that they barely notice the carnage in the images they consume.
Through its characterization of Beauchamp, Unforgiven announces its suspicion
of language and the translation of memory into story." Yet, the film also suggests that
experience and action can never fully and finally triumph over language, that myth
making and monumental memory may be, when all is said and done, uncontainable.
Thus, at the end of the film we see Beauchamp watching from the shadows as Munny
rides out of town, and are left to imagine Beauchamp's next liaison in the business
of fashioning the myths that glorify and romanticize vengeance.
II. REMEMBERING DEATH, REMEMBERING THE DEAD: MEMORY AGAINST
VENGEANCE
Neither Alice nor Beauchamp, as voices of memory, are able to work their own will
70. Miller, supra note 11, at 197.
7 1. As Tompkins puts it in describing this film genre, "Westerns distrust language. Time
and again they set up situations whose message is that words are weak and misleading, only
actions count; words are immaterial, only objects are real." TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 49.
2002]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the world. They are both dependent on others to undertake projects of vengeful
violence. Nor can the Schofield Kid's fantasy version of monumental memory sustain
a full-throated vengeance in its confrontation with the stark realities of violence.
Munny is different. He uses memory, though memory of a different kind, to defeat
or deflate the romance of revenge. He rejects Alice's seemingly unambiguous belief
in the equation of injury and response, and, unlike the Schofield Kid and Beauchamp,
he has seen through heroic myths and monumental history. He remembers the dead
and death,72 weighing the call for revenge against its consequences in dreams ended,
lives wasted, rotted corpses, and children left without parents.
Schofield Kid and William Munny
He is, as a result of those memories, at best ambivalent about vengeance, and he is
unreservedly hostile to the myths and memories that romanticize it. This is
highlighted in his initial reluctance tojoin the Schofield Kid. And, after he overcomes
this reluctance, all he can muster is "I guess" when Delilah asks whether he is "really
going to kill them cowboys."7 Still later, in a scene played out under a tree
reminiscent of the scene that opens the film, after the two cowboys have been killed,
the Schofield Kid begins to come to terms with his own memories, his own
understanding of what it means to kill. "It don't seem real," he says. "He ain't gonna
never breathe again. He's dead. And the other one too. All on account of pulling a
trigger."'74 Munny responds, "It's a hell of a thing killing another man. You take away
72. For a more complete exploration of this theme, see Dumm, supra note 34.
73. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
74. The Schofield Kid is awakening from a dream-like relation to the real. His comments
direct our attention to the relationship of film and a world so saturated by images that the world
beyond the film "doesn't seem real." Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42.
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all he's got and all he's gonna have. 75
When the Kid tries to reassure himself by recalling the justifying logic of
vengeance, "[Y]eah, well, I guess they had it coming," Munny says, "[W]e all have
it coming."'76 While vengeance speaks about what people have coming, about injury
and its deserved response, about the repayment of a "debt," in this play on words
Munny emphasizes that death comes to everyone regardless of desert.77 It is death as
a biological transformation, the end of physical existence and of hope and possibility,
rather than death as a matter ofjustice, that claims Munny's attention and, through
hin, ours.
Finally, by the time Munny himself has something more personal to
avenge-namely the unjustified and brutal beating, killing, and disgrace of his friend
Ned at the hands of Little Bill-viewers may have come to share Alice's perspective
that Little Bill did not do justice in his original response to Delilah's injury, that this
failure of law initiates a chain of action that leads to law's excess (Ned's killing), and
that this excess demands a vengeful response. Yet, Munny undercuts this perspective.
He can muster neither Alice's enthusiasm for vengeance, her confident voice of
remembrance, nor the heroic narrative imagination of the Schofield Kid or
Beauchamip.7" Thus, just before he kills Little Bill, Munny responds to his plea, "I
don't deserve this, to die like this,"' by again rejecting the legitimating logic of
revenge. "Deserve," Munny says, "got nothin' to do with it."8 In spite of its
suspicion of language, Unforgiven turns to language to deliver its critique of the
heroic, romantic glorification of revenge and its equation with justice.8 ' Munny's
"self-doubts about his life of violence, the fact that no one ever brought him to justice
for his past evil deeds, makes him think the delivery of justice purely random, a
matter of good or bad luck." 2
75. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
76. Id.
77. As Dumm suggests, this is "the hard truth that may be acknowledged by the killer, a
truth that cannot, however, be known." Dumm, supra note 34, at 11.
78. Miller notes what he calls "equivocations on the morality of revenge" even in the
shootout in Skinny's saloon, whererevenge seems most clearlyjustified. Miller, supra note 11,
at 192.
79. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
80. Id.
81. This critique of, and yet turn to, language is typical of Westerns. As Tompkins
describes them, in these films
the next thing you know, someone is using language brilliantly, delivering an epigram
so pithy and dense it might as well be a solid thing. In fact, Westerns go in for their
own special brand of bon mot, seasoned with skepticism and fried to a turn. The
product-chewy and tough-is recognizable anywhere... . The sayings all have one
thing in common: they bring you down.... The sayings puncture big ideas and self-
congratulation; delivered with perfect timing, they land like stones from a slingshot and
make a satisfying thunk.
TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 49-50.
82. Miller, supra note 11, at 195.
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William Munny About to Shoot Little Bill
Memory fuels Alice's desire for vengeance and the Schofield Kid and
Beauchamp's glorification of violence. But for Munny, memory disciplines the
vengeful urge, even as it haunts and torments those who would be its agents.3 His
constant awareness and remembrance of the horror of death stands between him and
enthusiasm for vengeance. His memories connect him to voiceless, decaying bodies.
Those memories overtake him; they haunt him. They ensure that Munny is constantly
aware of the fragility of life and the fact that little separates him from the unglorious
prospect of death. The past "presses him [Munny] down and bows his shoulders; he
travels with a dark invisible burden.
84
This difference is marked right from the start of the film in a scrolling narrative that
runs as we watch a man digging a grave beside a lone standing tree. The narrative
brands Munny a known thief and murderer, a man "of notoriously vicious and
intemperate disposition," 5 even as it eulogistically tells of the death of his wife,
Claudia, a comely woman of 29, who died, so the narrative says, not, as her mother
might have expected, at the hands of William Munny, but from smallpox. It is
Claudia, we learn, who domesticated and tamed Munny, somewhat more completely,
it seems, than he is able to domesticate and tame the animals on the farm he has been
left to tend.
In Westerns, the figure of the wife provides a moral center opposed to frontier
justice and acts as a brake (though a rarely successful one) on male violence. But, in
Unforgiven, Claudia is an absent presence calling on Munny to remember the self she
had helped him to (re)fashion. Both her presence and her absence are critical to the
83. Here, Unforgiven seems to be citing Shakespeare's Hamlet. See MARIORIE B. GARBER,
SHAKESPEARE'S GHOST WRITERS: LITERATURE As UNCANNY CAUSALITY, 147-53 (1987).
Susan Sage Heinzelman suggested this association and this text.
84. NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 5.
85. UNFORGIVEN supra note 30.
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film's understanding of memory.
Whereas Little Bill differentiates among the purposes of violence and those who
perpetrate it, separating "tramps, loafers, and bad men"86 from good men who make
mistakes, and justifies his own "lawful" brutality by contrasting it with the violence
of "assassins," Claudia memorializes the danger of violence no matter how "noble"
the cause to which it is put.
Unforgiven, like other Westerns, is structured by
a set of oppositions.... There are two choices: either you can remain in a world
of illusions... a world of fancy words and pretty actions... or you can face life
as it really is-blood, death, a cold wind blowing, and a gun in the hand. These
are the classic oppositions from which all Westerns derive their meaning: parlor
versus mesa, East versus West, woman versus man, illusion versus truth, words
vers s things. 7
IfBeauchamp anchors one side of this set of oppositions, Munny anchors the other.
And it is remembrance that, in turn, anchors Munny, afflicting him, keeping him
constantly in touch with what a life of violence does to life itself and with the real
world of death. Throughout the film he is in dialogue with Claudia, seeking to
reassure her that, even as he goes offto kill, he is no longer a killer. Claudia, it seems,
is a specter, not a command."' Munny buries her both literally and figuratively in the
film. Her voice is silenced; her meaning invoked byMunnyboth to condemn, but also
to make possible, his return to killing.
Before joining the Schofield Kid, he visits her grave and tells his children that she
liked the flowers he brought her. He tells them that their mother will be looking down
on them as he rides off to join the Kid, whom he had previously told, "I ain't like that
[a violent person] any more.... My wife, she cured me of that. Cured me of drink
and wickedness."' 9 In addition, Ned says, "If Claudia were alive, you wouldn't be
doing this [going off to avenge the injured prostitute]." Later, Munny repeats to Ned
what he had said to the Schofield Kid, "I ain't like that no more. Claudia, she
straightened me out.... And just 'cause we're going on a killing, that don't mean I
am going back to being the wayI was."' When Ned and he discuss sex, Munny says,
"Only woman who would like me is one you have to pay for. That ain't right, buying
flesh. Claudia, God rest her soul, wouldn't want me doing something like that."9
In this film the prostitutes take over for the absent wife. Yet, because their relations
with men are economic (more like relations among men than between men and their
wives), they cannot play the role generally assigned to wives. Thus, it is not
surprising that Alice's call for revenge finally exerts a greater pull on Munny than
does the memory of Claudia. Alice pursues her desire for revenge precisely because
86. Id.
87. TOMPKINs, supra note 55, at 48.
88. On the importance of this distinction for our understanding of the connection of
memory and justice, see Valverde, supra note 8, at 662.
89. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
90. Id. Dumm provides an insightful reading of these denials. See Durm, supra note 34,
at9, 10.
91. UNFORGIVEN supra note 30.
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the law (Little Bill) pushes her aside as a man in any Western might push his wife
aside, and as Munnyhiniself ultiately pushes Claudia aside. The absence of the wife
and the inadequacy, as well as the excessiveness, of law change the narrative
possibilities in the film, leaving only Munny, with his history of violence, to stand in
as the antiviolence figure.92
What appears to discipline his violence is his living connection to the dead, but also
memories that connect him to the grim realities of death itself. He is, in a sense, stuck
between life and death, an interpreter of the existential reality of death to the living.
His life and liminality exemplify Nietzsche's argument that "who[ever] cannot...
[settle] on the threshold of the moment and forget the [whole] past... will never
know what happiness is."93
Perhaps this is why Munny constantly refuses the invitation to narrate, to tell the
Schofield Kid the truth about his exploits, a truth that is too painful to keep alive.
Munny claims not to remember the violence he did, responding to the Kid's questions
by saying, "I can't remember. I was drunk most of the time."'95 That his past is
unnarrated and unnarratable is another of the film's antiromantic gestures. Munny's
"killer within" seems not to act on reason or principle. Instead, alcohol is the key that
releases his pent-up monster.' He denies the memory of his monstrous deeds so that
he can live. But memory overcomes denial when, three times during the film, Munny
does remember, conjuring up an image of death. His past returns, but only in dream
like recollections.
Each of these recollections is shared with Ned, his longtime friend and companion.
Each involves a horrible imagining of the fate that may await Munny. The first occurs
when, sitting together in a darkness illuminated only by a campfire, he asks, "Ned,
you remember that drover I shot through the mouth and his teeth came out the back
of his head? I think about him now and again. He didn't do anything to deserve to get
shot." The second remembrance is linked to the nightmarish claim that Munny has
seen someone who died long ago. Munny again asks Ned about someone that Munny
had killed. "You remember Eagle Hendershot? I saw him." "Will," Ned replies, "he
is dead." Undeterred, Munny insists, "I saw him, Ned. His head was all broke open,
you could see inside of it."'98
92. Communication from Martha Umphrey.
93. NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 6.
94. For an analysis of this refusal, see Miller, supra note 11, at 197-98. Tompkins claims
that this type of refusal to narrate is a demonstration of control. "The male," she says, "by
remaining 'hermetic,"closed up,' maintains the integrity of the boundary that divides him from
the world." See TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 56.
95. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
96. Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42. That Munny drinks before he
kills so he can kill suggests that alcohol is the only portal through which he can enter the
Western's "heroic" frame, even if he enters in less-than-heroic fashion. In contrast, the
Schofield Kid drinks only after he kills as he is renouncing violence. Alcohol provides a
medium through which the Kid can reenter the "real" world.
97. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
98. Id.
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Ned Listening to William Munny
The third vision of death is less a remembering than a premonition brought on by
a high fever that Munny experiences after having been beaten within an inch of his
life by Little Bill. "I've seen death," Munny announces. "I've seen the angel of death.
He's got snakes for eyes.... I saw Claudia too, all covered with worms. I'm scared
I'm dying."" His remembrance of the dead is joined to his remembrance of death,
producing a powerful fear that shapes Munny's response to the calls of a vengeful
violence.
In each of these remembered images of death, what Munny sees is not the living
survivor, but the corpse left behind. What he remembers is not the legend, but the
twisted remains. In this focus on the ugly horror of death, Unforgiven departs from,
and criticizes, the treatment of death in other Westerns where "death... is death
under the aspect of nature, of beauty, and of some kind of spiritual transcendence.""°
There is neither beauty nor transcendence in Munny's memories. In addition, his
memories are anything but monumental, anything but heroic. They are what Nietzsche
called "critical.''. Such memories "bring the past to the bar ofjudgment, interrogate
it remorselessly, and finally condemn it.... It is not justice that sits in judgment here
... but only life, the dim, driving force that insatiably desires-itself."1 2
The depth of Munny's hostility to heroic memory and monumental history is shown
in his last interactions with its two primary representatives in Unforgiven, the
Schofield Kid and Beauchamp. By the end of the film, the former has renounced the
spectacle of heroic memory and monumental history in the name of life. This
renunciation leads Munny to assure him, "You don't worry. I ain't going to kill you.
You're the only friend I've got."
99. Id.
100. TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 24.
101. NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 20.
102. Id.at 21.
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That Munny's real enemies are those who create the kind of heroic memory and
monumental history that fuels violence and glorifies vengeance is made clear after the
climactic shootout in Skinny's. Beauchamp is in the saloon with Bill and others
celebrating the capture of Ned when Munny appears. Emboldened by whiskey, he
seeks out Little Bill and Skinny to avenge Ned's killing and the dishonoring of his
body (Ned's body has been left in an open casket outside Skinny's saloon. The casket
is decorated with a sign that says: "This is whathappens to assassins around here.").'"3
It is as ifMunny has been reborn, or at least as if the "psychotic-killer- double-within"
that Munnypreviouslyhadso strenuouslyrenounced has reappeared, a self apparently
undivided in its embrace of vengeance." The camera suggests that Munny has
become an earlier, or perhaps different, self. His entrance is visually arresting; he is
again the classic gunfighter, nerves of steel, shotgun at the ready. As Tompkins puts
it, "at this juncture, the point where provocation has gone too far, retaliatory violence
becomes not simply justifiable, but imperative: now, we are made to feel, not to
transgress the interdict against violence would be the transgression.' 05
The film now tempts and tests its viewers. Will we, even after Munny's earlier
deflating admonitions to the Kid and his horrible memories of death, nonetheless
again be drawn into the spectacle of the classic Western? Do we desire, and will we
get pleasure from, yet, another movie shootout that Unforgiven is about to provide?
This shootout starts with little fanfare when Munny shoots Skinny. "Sir," Bill
shouts, "you are a cowardly son of a bitch! You just shot an unarmed man!" "Well,"
Munny responds, "he should have armed himself if he was going to decorate this
saloon with my friend."' ' Bill demands to know whether he is "one William Munny
... who killed women and children." "That's right," Munny answers, now in the full
glow of recollection, embracing the self he had previously renounced: "I've killed
women and children and about everything that walks or crawls at one time or another.
I'm here to kill you, Little Bill, for what you did to Ned."'0 7
Even as he takes revenge, no longer acting as the paid agent of another's anger but
now acting for himself and his dead friend, Munny insists on debunking its heroic
pretensions, linking vengeance to killing "women," "children," and "everything that
walks or crawls." At this point, the camera pans to Beauchamps's face with its wide-
eyed look, as if the narrator of other's memories will now become an eyewitness to
history. What follows is exactly the kind of action out of which Beauchamp makes
legends, as Munny kills five men single-handedly. And when Beauchamp crawls out
from under a body that has fallen on him, he displays no interest in the horror of the
carnage around him. Unlike the Schofield Kid, he is truly blind. Unlike Munny, he is
connected to neither the dead nor death itself.
Instead, he tries to substitute Munny for English Bob and Little Bill, wanting him
to become a character whose heroic persona he can fashion. "Who did you kill first?"
he asks. "I was lucky in the order," Munny replies as if debunking his own larger-
103. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
104. Communication from Richard Sherwin, supra note 42.
105. TOMPKINS, supra note 55, at 228 (emphasis in original).
106. UNFORGIVEN, supra note 30.
107. Id.
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than-life agency. "I've always been lucky when it comes to killing folks."'
Beauchamp and William Munny
When Beauchamp, licking his lips, eager for the full story, persists and asks, "[W]ho
was next?" Munny answers in a menacing tone, "[A]ll I can tell you is who is going
to be last." In contrast to his assurance to the Schofield Kid, this scene ends with an
ill-disguised threat to kill the author, the myth maker, before he can ply his fantasy-
inducing, death-doing trade again.
Vengeance is done, but it is neither the justice-doing, desert-oriented vengeance that
Alice seeks, nor the glorified, heroism-inspired violence that the Schofield Kid
initially imagines and that Beauchamp markets. Vengeance is done, but unheroically,
by someone who has long ago abandoned the idea that there can be either honor or
glory in the taking of human life. Munny is drawn to it reluctantly, regretfully, with
a full acknowledgment of the way acts of vengeance sanctify, but also dishonor, those
in whose names vengeance is taken as well as those who take revenge. Memory
speaks in order to remind both Munny and the film's viewers that those who wield the
violence of vengeance are like those whose unjust acts call it forth: unforgiven.
CONCLUSION
Vengeance, I have argued, depends on memory, but not all memory serves
vengeance equally or supports the same kind of vengeance. Unforgiven tells the story
of remembrance and revenge by seeking to separate the image from the world beyond
the image. In this narrative it is only the reality principle, the memory of direct
experience, that restrains or alters vengeance, turning the quest for glory into misery,
the quest forjustice into a horrifying confrontation with death and dying. On the other
hand, monumental memory, or its simulacrum, incites vengeance and romanticizes it.
108. Id.
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This film suggests that only by remaining in contact with the grim realities of death
can the violence of vengeance be left behind, or if not left behind, then at least taken
off its pedestal.
Another way of understanding the distinction between monumental and realist
memory on which Unforgiven relies would be to suggest that the former is steeped in
the literary and political work of memorialization, while the latter comes fairly close
to a kind of "history." It emphasizes facticity and is antiromantic and antiheroic.
Garber, in her work on Hamlet, captures this distinction by noting the difference
between two Hegelian terms for memory, "Erinnerung" and "Gedachtnis."' The
former, Garber says, is a "recollection," a kind of "inner gathering and preserving of
experience," which is active and creative; the latter "memory" is a "learning by rote
of names, or of words considered as names, and it can therefore not be separated from
the notation, the inscription, or the writing down of those names.""' In Garber's
discussion of Hamlet, she notes that Hamlet's absorption with the active, creative
work of recollection is disrupted by his encounter with the ghost. This collision
between two kinds of memory-one that allows for nostalgia and glorification, and
one that insists on the relationship between what is remembered and the world-is
precisely what Unforgiven portrays.'"
But, perhaps the dichotomy between the realist, antinarrative posture of
Unforgiven's taciturn leading man and the mythic imagination of the Schofield Kid,
or the crassly constructed monumental histories of Beauchamp, may be neither as
clear nor as determinate in its implications for the politics of revenge as the film
makes it out to be. In the end, violence is done, more bodies are rendered lifeless,
more corpses are left to decay, more ghosts are left to haunt memory. And, at the
conclusion of the film, Munny has disappeared, abandoning yet again his life, in
search of a new frontier.
Left behind are images of the compelling power of revenge, albeit a less-than-
glorious, less-than-glamorized revenge, a power so great it overcomes both Claudia's
handiwork (the new life she fashioned for Munny) and the horrors of Munny's own
remembrance. And what, do we imagine, is the fate of the Schofield Kid? Is his
renunciation of violence final, or will he again be seduced by the saturation presence
of image, fantasy, and spectacle? Is there a monster within him awaiting another
opportunity to awaken? Moreover, how significant is the shift from monumental to
realist memory in diminishing the incidence of vengeful violence? Is there an escape
from the world of images in which we are currently entrapped? What is the relation
between violent images and violent deeds? Unforgiven leaves these questions
unanswered.
Nonetheless, this film makes an important statement about the ways in which
memory speaks and about the complex connections between remembrance and
revenge. This film gives testimony to the power and consequences of the stories we
tell about violence and vengeance, as well as to the power and consequences of the
ways we remember. It invites its viewers to take up the task of reimagining the terms
on which we memorialize injury and injustice and asks us to remember that vengeful
109. GARBER, supra note 83, at 148.
110. Id. at 149.
111. This comparison was brought to my attention by Susan Sage Heinzelman.
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violence is always poised precariously between this world's call to do justice and the
shrug of indifference that may await us in the next.

